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NOTE
INSURER-INITIATED DIRECT ACTIONS AND

THE SECTION 1332(C) PROVISO: MAINTAINING
THE SPIRIT OF DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
INTRODUCTION

In 1964, Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c), adding a proviso

designed to narrow the scope of federal diversity jurisdiction.'
provides

It

[t]hat in any direct action against the insurer of a policy or contract

of liability insurance, whether incorporated or unincorporated, to
which action the insured is not joined as a party-defendant, such
insurer shall be deemed a citizen of the State of which the insured
is a citizen, as well as of any State by which the insurer has been
incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of
2
business.

This amendment is consistent with other congressional legislation
limiting the scope of diversity jurisdiction by expanding the definition
of corporate citizenship. 3 An insurance company may now be treated
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (c) (1976), as amended by Act of Aug. 14. 1964, Pub. L. No88-439, § 1, 78 Stat. 445.
2. Id.
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976), as amended by Act of July 25. 19S. Pub. L.
No. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415. Initially, a corporation wvas considered a citizen of
every state of which its shareholders were citizens. See Bank of the United States v
Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 84, 86-87 (1809). As corporations gres in size and
complexity, however, their constituent shareholders became increasingly heterogeneous, thereby making this method of determining corporate citizenship too cumbersome for practical application. See Louisville C. & C.R.. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2
How.) 497, 554 (1844). To alleviate the problem. courts applied an irrebuttable presumption that all corporate shareholders were citizens of the state in \shich the torporation was chartered. Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R.. 57 U.S. 16 Hows.) 314, 328
(1853); Louisville C. & C.R.R. v. Letson. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 478, 535 1844). see
Jurisdictionof Federal Courts Concerning Diversity of Citizenship. lharings on II R.
2516 and H.R. 4497 Before Subcomin. No. 3 (fthe House Comn. on the Judiciary,
85th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1957) [hereinafter cited as harngs] (statement of Rep.
Tuck). This method was codified in the Judiciar% Act of 1887-8. ch. 373. § 1. 24
Stat. 552. The 1958 amendment narrowed the scope of diversity jurisdiction b% expanding corporate citizenship to include both the state of incorporation and the corporation's principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) 1976), as ainvidel by Act
of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554. § 2. 72 Stat. 415. see RIH. Boulign%, Inc. v.
United Steelworkers, 336 F.2d 160. 164 (4th Cir. 19641 (presumption that stockholders are citizens of state of incorporation abandoned, corporate citizenship created b%
Congressional act), affd. 382 U.S. 145 (1965). The amendment %%as necessar bencause the previous formula for corporate citizenship allowsed corporations actcess to
the federal courts too often. For example. a corporation chartered in state X. but
conducting all its business in state Y. could invoke federal disersits jurisdiction in
actions against local parties arising out of local corporate actis t% Svt notes 55-.56
infra and accompanying text. This was viewed as an abuse of diersits jurisdiction.
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as a citizen of three different states for purposes of determining diversity in a given action.4 If the adverse party's citizenship coincides
with any of the insurance company's citizenships, the federal courts
will not have diversity jurisdiction over the case. 5
Although the effect of the proviso is undisputed, 6 there is currently
a split between the Fifth and Sixth Circuits as to whether the phrase
"against the insurer" limits the proviso to those direct actions actually
initiated by the injured party or whether it encompasses all direct
actions between an injured party and the alleged tortfeasor's insurance company. 7 The Fifth Circuit reasons that for diversity purposes
there is no substantive difference between actions on policies of liability insurance brought against and those brought by insurers. 8 In

Hearings, supra, at 8, 11 (statements of Rep. Ashley and Judge Mars); C. Wright,
Handbook of the Law of Federal Courts § 23, at 86-87 (3d ed. 1976).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1976); cf. Campbell v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 552
F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 197Th (citizen of only two states because insurance company was
chartered and had principal place of business in same state); Hernandez v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 489 F.2d 721 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974). For
example, an insurance company based in New York and chartered in Delaware,
which insures a New Jersey citizen, would be considered a citizen of all three states
in any direct action brought by an injured claimant against the insurance company.
5. See Campbell v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 552 F,2d 604, 605 (5th Cir. 1977).
Vines v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 267 F. Supp. 436, 439 (E.D, Tenn.
1967). The federal diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1976), does not give a
pleader the option to allege only one of a corporation's fictional citizenships. E.g..
Canton v. Angelina Cas. Co., 279 F.2d 553, 554 (5th Cir. 1960) (action under workmen's compensation law); Fiorentino v. Travelers Ins. Co., 448 F. Supp. 1364, 1367
(E.D. Pa. 1978) (action against insurer for failure to provide coverage); McGlynn v.
Employers Commercial Union Ins. Co., 386 F. Supp. 774, 777 (D.P.R. 1974) (direct
action against insurer of United States Navy; insured Navy has no citizenship for
diversity purposes).
6. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Ins. Co. v. Greene, 606 F.2d 123, 12.5-26 (6th Cir. 1979);
Hernandez v. Travelers Ins. Co., 489 F.2d 721, 722 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 844 (1974); Vines '. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 267 F. Supp, 436,
438-39 (E.D. Tenn. 196T; Weckstein, The 1964 Diversity Amendment: Congressional
Indirect Action Against State "Direct Action" Laws, 1965 Wis. L. Rev. 268, 271.
7. Compare Aetna Cas. & Sur. Ins. Co. v. Greene, 606 F.2d 123, 127-28 (6th
Cir. 1979) (holding § 1332(c) proviso inapplicable) with Campbell v. Insurance Co. of
N. Am., 552 F.2d 604, 605 (5th Cir. 1977) (proviso held applicable to reverse direct
actions) and Government Employees Ins. Co. v. LeBleu, 272 F. Supp. 421, 429
(E.D. La. 1967) (indicating same in dicta). A direct action is one in which the insurer
replaces the insured as the party against whom liability is sought to be imposed.
Walker v. Firemans Fund Ins. Co., 260 F. Supp. 95, 96 (D. Mont. 1966). Reverse
direct actions arise, for example, when an insurer brings a declaratory judgment action to decide all potential liability issues arising out of a particular incident, 606
F.2d at 125, or when a workmen's compensation insurer challenges an award to an
employee made by a state workmen's compensation board. 552 F.2d at 604.
8. Campbell v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 552 F.2d 604, 605 (5th Cir. 1977). See
also O.M. Greene Livestock Co. v. Azalea Meats, Inc., 516 F.2d 509, 510 (5th Cir.
1975) (statute merits a broad interpretation in light of the harm Congress sought to
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either case, the essence of the proceeding is to determine the validity
and amount of a claim against the insurer. 9 The Sixth Circuit, on the
other hand, refuses to apply the proviso to actions initiated by an
insurer. 10 It bases this refusal on a literal reading of the phrase
"against the insurer" coupled Mvth a conviction that it would be unfair
to force an out-of-state insurer to bring an action in the home forum
of its adversary. 1
The correct interpretation of the proviso depends upon an examination of three factors. First, it must be determined whether the proviso should be read literally to prohibit federal court jurisdiction only
in actions brought against insurers. Second, if the plain meaning of
the proviso does not limit its application, it must be ascertained
whether actions brought by insurers are the type of local matter that
Congress sought to restrict to state court adjudication. Finally, the
practical and theoretical public policy considerations involved and the
implications for the future role of diversity jurisdiction in our national
court system must be examined. This Note contends that the proviso
should be applicable to all direct actions involving an injured part%
and an insurance company. Diversity jurisdiction should, therefore,
be denied whenever the injured part, and the party allegedly responsible for the injury are citizens of the same state.
I. INTERPRETING THE PROVISO

A. The Louisiana Problem-Catalyst for Change
The background of the 1964 amendment to section 1332(c) is
unique. Although the proviso altered the procedural rules for all fedremedy); Williams v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.. 468 F.2d 1207. 1209 (5th Cir. 1972
(insurer deemed a citizen of the state of its insured in any direct action in which the
insured is not joined as a party-defendant).
9. Campbell v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.. 552 F.2d 604. 605 (5th Cir. 1977. In
Campbell, the insurer contested an award of workmen's compensation by the Texas
Industrial Accident Board in a trial de novo. Although the insurer wvas the nominal
plaintiff, the court held that the overall proceeding was more properly characterized
as initiated by the injured workman against the insurer. Id.
10. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Ins. Co. v. Greene, 606 F.2d 123. 127 (6th Cir. 1979); set,
Henderson v. Selective Ins. Co.. 369 F.2d 143, 149 (6th Cir. 1966. The First Circuit
also favors a narrow interpretation of the proviso. In White v. United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co., 356 F.2d 746 (1st Cir. 1966). the court held that. betause the action
was brought by the plaintiff against her own insurer, it was not a direct action within
the scope of the § 1332(c) proviso. Id. at 748. Although this holding is generally
accepted, see, e.g., Fiorentino v. Travelers Ins. Co.. 448 F. Supp. 1364 (E. D. Pa.
1978); Adams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 313 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Miss.
1970); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. LeBleu. 272 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. La.
1967); Walker v. Firemans Fund Ins. Co.. 260 F. Supp. 95 (D. Mont. 1966). the
First Circuit also noted that the proviso refers only to cases brought pursuant to
direct action statutes by the victim of an alleged tort against the liability insurer. 3.56
F.2d at 747.
11. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Is. Co. v. Greene. 606 F.2d 12.3. 126-2, 6th Cir 1979)
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eral courts, its enactment was mainly precipitated by Congressional
concern with the congested calendar of the Eastern District of
Louisiana. 12 Statistics gathered by the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts indicated that by 1962 this district had the
highest annual caseload per judgeship of all districts in the nation.
The average 512 cases per year allocated to each judge was more than
twice the national average. 13
The major reason for the overcrowding of the federal dockets was
the operation of Louisiana's direct action statute. 14 Under a direct
action statute, an injured party has the right to sue the insurer of an
alleged tortfeasor directly. 15 It is not necessary for the plaintiff either
to join the insured as a party defendant or to first obtain a judgment
against the insured. 16 The majority of tort cases involve two or more

12. Home Indem. Co. v. Moore, 499 F.2d 1202, 1205 (8th Cir. 1974); Hernandez
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 489 F.2d 721, 723 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974);
110 Cong. Rec. 9313-17 (1964); S. Rep. No. 1308, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 [hereinafter
cited as Senate Report], reprinted in [1964] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2778,
2783-84.
13. 110 Cong. Rec. 9313-14 (1964); Senate Report, supra note 12, at 4, reprinted
in [1964] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2781. The average annual caseload for
each judge in Louisiana's Eastern District, weighted by such factors as complexity of
and time spent on each case, exceeded the national average by 270 cases. Additionally, this caseload was 81 cases higher than that of the Eastern District of Virginia,
Louisiana's closest competitor. Id. at 4, reprinted in [1964] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 2781.
14. The Louisiana statute provides in part that "[t]he injured person or his or her
survivors or heirs .... at their option, shall have a right of direct action against the
insurer within the terms and limits of the policy; and such action may be brought
against the insurer alone, or against both the insured and insurer jointly." La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 22:655 (West 1978); see P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 26, § 2003 (1976); Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 632.24 (West 1980). The Louisiana direct action statute, in conjunction with
the pre-1964 diversity statute, allowed plaintiffs entry to federal court in nearly all
tort matters. Even automobile accident cases, which are predominantly local in nature, could he heard in federal courts if the defendant's insurance company was incorporated and had its principal place of business outside of Louisiana. Address by
Elmore Whitehurst, Judicial Conference of the Tenth Circuit (July, 1955) [hereinafter
cited as Whitehurst Speech], reprinted in Hearings, supra note 3,at 50; see Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48 (1954) (arising out of automobile
accident involving two Louisiana citizens). Various conditions, in addition to Louisiana's direct action statute, compounded the severe docket congestion in the Eastern
District. First, increased use of the Port of New Orleans caused an increase in the
number of maritime cases heard in the federal courts. Second, attorneys in Louisiana
displayed a marked preference for federal court trials, even though trial was available
in state court within a few weeks, because findings of fact are reviewed on appeal in
the state court system. Senate Report, supra note 12, at 4, reprinted in [19641 US.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2781.
15. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22:655 (West 1978); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 26, § 2003
(1976); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 632.24 (West 1980).
16. Irvin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 436 F. Supp. 575, 577 (W.D. Okla. 1977); Lank v.
Federal Ins. Co., 309 F. Supp. 349, 351 (D. Del. 1970). Absent the direct action
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citizens of the same state.' 7 The insurers of these parties, however,
are often corporations that are citizens of foreign jurisdictions by virtue of their states of incorporation and principal places of business. 18
Consequently, direct action statutes, while aimed at facilitating reparation to injured parties,' 9 have the collateral effect of creating a new
class of cases that, by pre-1964 standards, qualify for diversity jurisdiction. 20 Therefore, partially to relieve the enormous burden resting
on the four judges of the Eastern District,2 1 Congress amended section 1332(c) and thereby eliminated this particular means of access to
22
the federal courts.

statute, it is generally necessary for a party to sue first and get a judgment against
the insured, or at lehst to join the insured as a party defendant. Note. Direct Actions
by Claimants Againt Liability Insurers, 27 Fed'n of Ins. Counsel Q. 33, 34 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Direct Actions]. Direct action statutes, therefore, provide a
more direct means of reaching the "pocket" from which reparations to an injured
party claimant are ultimately taken. Additionally. some commentators view direct
action statutes as part of a modern trend to transform liability insurance into a system
of reparations for injured parties. 8 J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 4862
(2d ed. 1962); Direct Actions, supra, at 33. Underlying this trend is the theory that,
as a matter of public policy, insurance should be designed to protect the innocent
injured party rather than to indemnify the party responsible for his injury. See id. at
33-35. In fact, the intent of the Louisiana direct action statute is "that all liability
policies within their terms and limits are executed for the benefit of all injured persons, his or her survivors or heirs, to whom the insured is liable.** L. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 22:655 (West 1978): see Whitehurst Speech. Viupra note 14, reprinted in
Hearings, supra note 3, at 50-51.
17. Whitehurst Speech, supra note 14, reprinted in Hearings. vupra note 3. at
50.
18. Direct Actions, supra note 16. at 38.
19. See note 16 supra.
20. The United States Supreme Court acknowledged this effect of the Louisiana
direct action statute in Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert. 348 U.S. 48 (1954).
This case arose out of an automobile accident involving two Louisiana citizens. The
Court held that, because the action \was brought directly against an Illinois insurer,
diversity jurisdiction existed. Id. at 51-53. In his concurring opinion. Justice
Franlffurter foresaw the serious administrative difficulties potentially engendered by
direct action statutes. Id. at 57-60.
21. 110 Cong. Rec. 9316 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Boggs). Senate Report, supra
note 12, at 6-7, reprinted in [1964] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2783-84.
22. 110 Cong. Rec. 9317 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Boggs); Senate Report. -upra
note 12, at 6-7, reprinted in [1964] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2784. There
have been several suggestions that the overcrowding in Louisiana would have been
better remedied in ways other than through federal intervention. One view. presented during the debates, was that, rather than seeking to change federal law to
accommodate Louisiana at the expense of what had been a useful and convenient
system in Wisconsin, the state of Louisiana should have revised its direct action
statute. 110 Cong. Rec. 9316 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier). Another view
suggests that, rather than denying the federal courts jurisdiction over controversies
properly within their power, the number of judges in the district should have been
increased. 1 J. Moore, Federal Practice " 0.77[4], at 721.5 (2d ed. 19SOi. Both of
these solutions were rejected by Congress. The debates in the House indicate the
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B. Plain Meaning vs. Expansive Construction
Because of the parochial nature of the situation that precipitated
the section 1332(c) proviso, it has, at times, received restrictive judicial construction. 2 3 The Sixth Circuit has argued that, because the
proviso is unambiguous on its face and because Congress never con24
sidered the effect of insurer-initiated actions on the federal dockets,
it must be read literally. 2 5 It contends that Congressional silence
cannot be construed to allow an expansive interpretation of the literal
statutory language. 2 6 For this reason, the Sixth Circuit holds that to
construe the phrase "against the insurer" as encompassing actions
extent to which Congress is reluctant to interfere with the sovereign rights of the
states. 110 Cong. Rec. 9316 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Mathias). The suggestion that
more judges be appointed to handle the large caseload was not seriously considered.
See 110 Cong. Rec. 9316 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Boggs). There is a long standing
fear that increasing the number of judgeships tends to reduce the qualification standards, thereby "depreciat[ing] ... the judicial currency." Lumbermen's Mut. Cas.
Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 59 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); accord, Hearings,
supra note 3, at 5 (statement of Rep. Tuck); see Frankfurter, Distributionof Judicial
Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 Cornell L.Q. 499, 502 (1928). Not
every action initiated against an insurer, without joinder of the insured, is held to he
direct and therefore within the coverage of the § 1332(c) proviso. Diversity jurisdiction has been extended in interpleader cases, Home Indem. Co. v. Moore, 499 F.2d
1202 (8th Cir. 1974), and actions brought to enforce uninsured motorist coverage.
O'Hanlon v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 439 F. Supp. 377 (D. Del. 1977):
Irvin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 436 F. Supp. 575 (W.D. Okla. 1977); Adams v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 313 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Miss. 1970). On the other hand,
diversity jurisdiction has been denied in certain cases in which the insured could not
have been joined as a party-defendant. See, e.g., Ferrara v. Aetna Cas. & Stir., 436
F. Supp. 929 (W.D. Ark. 1977) (insurer deemed citizen of state of insured hospital
although hospital could not have been sued because of charitable immunity doctrine);
Salgado v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 326 F. Supp. 285 (D.P.R. 1971) (insurer
deemed citizen of state of insured although statute of limitations had run on cause of
action against insured).
23. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Ins. Co. v. Greene, 606 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1979); note
10 supra; cf. White v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 356 F.2d 746 (1st Cir.
1966) (holding proviso inapplicable to declaratory judgment action brought by insured
against own insurer); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. LeBleu, 272 F. Supp. 421
(E.D. La. 1967) (holding proviso inapplicable to declaratory judgment action brought
by insurer against own insured).
24. In Aetna Cas. & Sur. Ins. Co. v. Greene, 606 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1979), the
court observed that Congress did not consider that inurers may bring actions to
determine their liability to prospective claimants. The court similarly found that
every case brought pursuant to the the Louisiana direct action statute was by the
injured party. Id. at 127. This finding, however, is not verified by the statistics Congress studied while considering the 1964 amendment. These statistics indicate
neither the number of cases actually brought under direct action statutes nor the
parties bringing them. See 110 Cong. Rec. 9313-14 (1964); Senate Report, supra note
12, at 3-7, reprinted in 11964] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2779-83.
25. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Ins. Co. v. Greene, 606 F.2d 123, 127 (6th Cir. 1979).
26. "No court is allowed to supplement a clear statutory provision such as
1332(c), even when such supplement would produce beneficial results. To do so
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brought by an insurer would exceed the court's authority and would
27
amount to judicial legislation.
This reasoning is subject to question in two respects. First, although the general rules governing judicial construction of statutes
require the courts to be faithful to a statute as written by Congress, 28
the "plain meaning" doctrine does not bar them from considering extrinsic factors. 29 Furthermore, when there is genuine doubt concerning the proper interpretation of a statute, or a part thereof, there is a
greater need to examine the legislative histor\" to determine how the
legislators would apply the statute to the set of facts at issue. 30 As
evidenced by the different meanings assigned the "'against the insurer" clause in the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, even a simple phrase is
susceptible of different interpretations when applied to varying factual

would exceed the court's power of statutory interpretation, and would encroach upon
the congressional power to legislate." Id. at 127-28.
27. Id.
28. Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392. 400 (1966) (quoting United
States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940)); Gemsco, Inc. v. Wailing, 324 U.S. 244, 260 (1945); cf. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm'n, 573 F.2d 157. 160 (3d Cir. 1978) (in absence of authoritative
agency interpretation, courts should rely on plain wording of administrative agency
standard).
29. The "plain meaning" rule dictates that "[e]ven though the court should be
convinced that some other meaning was really intended by the law-making power.
and even though the literal interpretation should defeat the very purposes of the
enactment, still the explicit declaration of the legislature is the law." 1H. Black.
Hornbook on the Construction and Interpretation Of The Laws 45 (2d ed. 191P.
Strict adherence to the literal or plain meaning rule has been largely abandoned in
favor of an approach that allows courts to consider a statute's background and legislative history regardless of its facial clarity. Harrison v. Northern Trust Co.. 317 U.S.
476, 479 (1943) ("[W]ords are inexact tools at best, and for that reason there is wisely
no rule of law forbidding resort to explanatory legislative history no matter how 'clear
the words may appear on "superficial examination.". "(quoting United States v.
American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534. 544 (1940)); accord. Train v. Colorado Pub.
Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1. 10 (1976); Aviation Consumer Action Project v.
Washburn, 535 F.2d 101. 106 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Air Reduction Co. '. Hickel. 420
F.2d 592, 595 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Indeed, resort by courts to the "'plain meianing"
rule to support their readings of particular statutes has been referred to as -a kind of
verbal table thumping to express or reinforce confidence in an interpretation arrived
at on other grounds instead of a reason for it." 2A C. Sands. Sutherland's Statutes
and Statutory Construction § 46.01, at 49 (4th ed. 1972) (hereinafter cited as Sutherland]. See generally Murphy, Old Maxims Necer Dic. The 'lain -.1calling Rul" al
Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts. 75 Colum L. Re. 1299
(1975) (arguing that plain meaning rule interferes with determination of legislative
intent in enacting statutes).
30. Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707. 713-14 (1975). United States %.Sisson,
399 U.S. 267, 307 (1970); Cawlev v. United States, 272 F.2d 443. 445 (2d Cir. 1959)
(L. Hand, J.) ("We are to put ourselves so far as we can in the position of the
legislature that uttered them, and decide whether or not it would declare that the
situation that has arisen is within what it wished to cover."k
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situations. 3 1 Therefore, a court's decision to construe a seemingly
unambiguous phrase does not constitute usurpation of the legislative
power. On the contrary, failure to delve beyond the common meaning of such a 32
phrase would be an abdication of its judicial duty to
interpret laws.
Second, the Sixth Circuit's assertion that the proviso is inapplicable
to insurer-initiated actions because these were not considered by
Congress is an overly restrictive reading of the legislative history. 33
Under this view, courts would only apply a given piece of legislation
under conditions identical to the one that prompted Congress to
enact it. It is unrealistic, however, to assume that the legislature discusses, or even anticipates, every situation that properly lies within
the scope of a given law. 34 Although such a cautious approach would
prevent misapplication of the statute, it could also frustrate the legislative purpose by ignoring the more general Congressional fear
evoked by the scrutinized incidents. 35 This likelihood is particularly
strong where, as here, Congress chose to remedy an apparently isolated local problem by means of legislation affecting the federal courts
of the entire nation. 36 Additionally, the rules governing judicial con-

31. See notes 6-11 supra and accompanying text.
32. United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940);
Ozawa v. United States. 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922).
33. This approach is no longer a tenable ground for refusal to apply a statute to a
particular set of facts. See Montana Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 445 F.2d
739, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (holding that where Congress was silent court must "project" legislative intent), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1013 (1971); United States v.
McDaniels, 370 F. Supp. 298, 311-12 (E.D. La. 1973) (same), aff'd sub norn. United
States v. Goff, 509 F.2d 825 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 857 (1975); cf. 2A
Sutherland, supra note 29, § 45.09, at 29 ("Courts cannot avoid the problem [of
legislative silence] by refusing to apply the statute in such a case on the ground that
the legislature has not yet extended the statute to make it clearly apply, because a
ruling of that nature would itself amount to an interpretation that the statute is inapplicable.").
34. See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 380 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974); Massachusetts Trustees of Gas & Fuel Assocs. v. United States, 312 F.2d 214, 222-23 (1st Cir. 1963), affd, 377 U.S. 235
(1964).
35. There is support for the view that a statute's operation should not be confined
to the specific events that prompted the legislation. Rather, "the words of a statute
should be regarded as embodying a kind of delegation of authority to exercise responsible creative judgment in relating the statutory concept, spirit, purpose, or policy to changing needs of society." 2A Sutherland, supra note 29, § 45.09; see, e.g..
Elgin J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 738-41 (1945) (construing the Railway
Labor Act in situation unforeseen by Congress); Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. United
States, 504 F.2d 1400, 1,102-03 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (applying Customs Simplification Act
of 1954 to situation not contemplated by Congress).
36. The legislative history indicates that the statute was designed to have more
than parochial application. The Judiciary Committee expressed the feeling that the
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struction of remedial or procedural statutes, such as the 1964
amendment,3 7 provide that such statutes should be read expansively
so that "if there be any doubt or ambiguity, that construction should
be adopted which will best advance the remedy provided and help to
suppress the mischief against which it was aimed."3 8
Indeed, courts, implicitly recognizing the intent of Congress in
enacting section 1332(c), have broadly interpreted other terms central
to determining the scope of the proviso's application. Specifically,
both the phrases "direct action" and "policy or contract of liability
insurance" 3 9 have been the subjects of judicial scrutiny. Although
these phrases may well owe their presence in the proviso to the circumstances existing in the Eastern District of Louisiana in 1964,40 the
interpretations given them have not been restricted to the Louisiana
situation. "Direct action," for example, has been held to encompass
all actions brought by an injured party directly against the alleged
tortfeasor's liability insurer, regardless of whether the suit is brought
under a direct action statute.4 1 Thus, "direct action" covers declara-

statistics gathered in Louisiana indicated what might be expected to occur iii federal
courts throughout the country should the other states enact similar legislation. Senate
Report, supra note 12, at 7, reprinted in [1964] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
2783-84; accord, 110 Cong. Rec. 9316 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Boggs) C"[Ilf we fail to
spell this out in this particular instance, it could very well be that 48 other States
would enact statutes similar to this one. The net effect would be that the Federal
district courts, for all practical purposes, would become State courts in all tort matters.").
37. Procedural statutes, as distinguished from those dealing with substantive
rights, are usually described as remedial. 3 Sutherland. supra note 29. § 60.0.5. at
39. Because no well-established personal or property rights are affected, these statutes are given a liberal. expansive interpretation to suppress the evil and advance the
remedy intended by Congress. See Tcherepnin v. Knight. 389 U.S. 332. 3.36 (1671.
McMurrv v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co.. 458 F. Supp. 209. 211 tE.D.
Mich. 1978); Kappel v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 426, 432 tW.D. Pa. 196S), affd.
437 F.2d 12221 (3d Cir.), cert. denied. 404 U.S. 830 (1971), Brennan v Midwvestern
United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 678-79 tN.D. Ind. 1966). a.rd, 417 F.2d
147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 k19 7 0).
38. H. Black, supra note 29. at 487.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1976).
40. Both phrases are included in the Louisiana direct action statute. La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 22:655 (West 1978).
41. Hernandez v. Travelers Ins. Co.. 489 F.2d 721. 723-24 t5th Cir.), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974). The Hernandez court confronted the argument that the
scope of the 1964 amendment should be limited to actions brought under statutes
similar to that of Louisiana. It held, however, that the proviso also encompasses
direct suits under workmen's compensation law. stating that "[whatever may have
been the specific evil prompting congressional action in 1964. Congress chose to
remove all direct actions from the diversity jurisdiction." Id. at 723. see Vines v,
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 267 F. Supp. 436. 438-39 tE.D. Tenn. 1967.
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tory judgment actions,4 2 workmen's compensation actions, 4 3 and even
actions converted into direct actions by dismissal of a party defendant.4 4 Similarly, the term "policy or contract of liability insurance"
has been held to include workmen's compensation insurance agree47
ments, 45 omnibus insurance policies, 46 no-fault insurance contracts,
and any "indemnity agreement which protects the insured against his
' 8
liability to others."
Vines v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 4 9 best exemplifies
the reasoning underlying this broad construction. This was an action
by an employee against his employer's workmen's compensation in-

42. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Ins. Co. v. Greene, 606 F.2d 123, 125, 127 (6th Cir.
1979); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. LeBleu, 272 F. Supp. 421, 429 (E.D. La.
1967). But see Henderson v. Selective Ins. Co., 369 F.2d 143, 149 (6th Cir. 1966)
(action by judgment creditors against liability insurers); White v. United States Fidel.
ity & Guar. Co., 356 F.2d 746, 747 (1st Cir. 1966) (action by insured against his own
insurer).
43. Hernandez v. Travelers Ins. Co., 489 F.2d 721 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 844 (1974); Vaughn v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 62 F.R.D. 480 (E.D.
Tex. 1974).
44. O.M. Greene Livestock Co. v. Azalea Meats, Inc., 516 F.2d 509, 510 (5th
Cir. 1975) (per curiam). The claim in O.M. Greene was not brought under a direct
action statute. Rather, the insured, initially joined as a party defendant, was subsequently dismissed in an effort to produce diversity of citizenship. Id. at 510-11.
Holding that § 133 2 (c) does not require a state direct action statute similar to
Louisiana's, the court stated that it had "given the statute the broad interpretation it
deserves in light of the harm Congress sought to remedy." Id. at 510.
45. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Ins. Co. v. Greene, 606 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1979);
Hernandez v. Travelers Ins. Co., 489 F.2d 721 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844
(1974); Vaughn v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 62 F.R.D. 480 (E.D. Tex. 1974I).
46. Torres v. Hartford Ins. Co., 588 F.2d 848 (1st Cir. 1978); Williams v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 468 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1972); Anderson v. Phoenix of Hartford Ins.
Co., 320 F. Supp. 399 (W.D. La. 1970). An omnibus clause in an insurance policy
includes any person driving the vehicle with the owner's permission in the term
"insured". Id. at 402. Application of the proviso to omnibus insurance policies has
been criticized as not only preventing the potential diversity jurisdiction created by
the direct action procedure, but eliminating diversity from actions between truly diverse parties. 26 Wayne L. Rev. 1051 (1980). Under the holdings of Torres, WVilians, and Anderson, the insurer is assigned four state citizenships, incorporation,
principal place of business, state of contract insured, and state of omnibus insured.
This occurs when a plaintiff from state X is injured by another citizen of state X who'
is covered by the omnibus insurance plan of his employer, a citizen of state Y. The
employer is the natural object of suit because he is more likely to be able to pay a
judgment. If plaintiff sued employer's insurer directly, however, diversity jurisdiction
would not exist because under § 1332(c) the insurer would assume the citizenship of
both the employer and the omnibus insured. Id. at 1062-64.
47. McMurry v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 458 F. Supp. 209, 211
(E.D. Mich. 1978) (finding Michigan no-fault statute, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§
500.3101-.3179 (Supp. 1980-1981), a species of direct action statute).
48. Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Wilkerson, 247 F. Supp. 766, 767 (E.D. Tenn.
1965).
49. 267 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Tenn. 1967).
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surance carrier. 50 Rejecting the plaintiffs contention that the legislative history of the amendment limited its application to actions nearly
identical to those brought under the Louisiana direct action statute,5 1
the court stated that "the legislation is not subject to such a restrictive interpretation. .

.

. [Tlhere is no adequate basis for the inference

that Congress intended that such a fine distinction be applied."52 In
fact, the legislative history of diversity jurisdiction validates this view.
The history of the 1964 amendment cannot be fully understood if
approached as an isolated piece of legislation. 53 It is, rather, a
further modification
of diversity jurisdiction begun by the 1958
54
amendment.
C. Congressional Purpose-Removing Local Matters
from FederalJusridiction
During the quarter century preceding the 1958 amendment, Congress became increasingly aware that the rules governing diversitys
jurisdiction were inadequate to deal with the rising flood of corporate
litigation. 5 5 Companies with established operations in a given state
50. Id. at 437; see Lane v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.. 268 F. Supp. 345, 345
(E. D. Tenn. 1967).
51. 267 F. Supp. at 438.
52. Id. The Vines court did not directly address the issue of the proper interpretation of the "against the insurer" clause. It did, however, indicate that it would be
hesitant to subject this clause to any "fine distinction[s]." Id. The court noted that
Congress intended that the proviso appl%"wherever a part% claiming to have suffered
injuries or damage for which another is legally responsible is e'ntitl'd to yue tile
other's liability insur[elr without joining the insured and ssithout having first obtained
a judgment against the insured." Id. at 438-39 (emphasis added).
53. Statutory amendments are to he read in conjunction with those sections they
modif", and the amended statute should be read as if it had been originall% enacted
in that form. Blair v. Chicago, 201 U.S. 400. 475 (1906). Republic Steel Corp.
v. Costle, 581 F.2d 1228, 1232 (6th Cir. 1978). cert. denied, 440 US, 909 (1979.
Kirchner v. Kansas Turnpike Auth.. 336 F.2d 222. 230 (10th Cir. 19641.
54. In addition to amending the law to provide that a corporation shall be
deemed a citizen of both the state in which it has its principal place of business and
its state of incorporation, the Act of July 25, 1958. Pub. L. 85-554. § 2. 72 Stat. 415.
increased the amount necessary to qualify civil cases for federal jurisdiction from
$3,000 to $10,000. This minimum amount in controversy applies both to suits
brought under federal law and to those involving diversity of citizenship. Additionally, the problems potentially caused by direct action statutes were discussed during
the hearings on the 1958 amendment. Hearings. supra note 3. at 34 (statement of
Judge Maris).
55. Numerous proposals to curtail the use of diversity jurisdiction by corporations
were considered both during and before this period. See. e.g., fl.R. 4219. 46th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1880) (seeking to eliminate diversity jurisdiction between a corporation and a citizen of any state in which the corporation is doing busines. S. Rep.
No. 530, 72d Cong., Ist Sess. (1934) (Attorney General Mitchell's proposed amendment to eliminate diversity jurisdiction). President Hoover's Message to Congress
Recommending Methods to Improve Judicial Administration (Feb. 29. 1932 (on file
,vith the Fordham Law Reciew) (same). See also H.R. 2516. 85th Cong.. 1st Sess,
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had access to the federal courts in suits involving local parties simply
because they were chartered in another jurisdiction. Even corporations conducting business entirely within their adversary's state of
citizenship could sue in federal court. 56 Both Congress and the
judiciary ultimately came to view such local actions as outside the
spirit of diversity jurisdiction. 57 The 1958 amendment eliminated the
most flagrant of these abuses 58 by adding a corporation's principal
place of business to the states of which it is considered a citizen,
thereby preventing at least one group of local actions from reaching
the federal courts.- 9 By 1964, it had become apparent to both Congress and the judiciary that the direct action device provided a new
means through which local controversies could be heard in federal
court.6 0 The response of Congress was once again to modify the

(1964) (to eliminate corporations as litigants under the diversity of citizenship provisions); Doub, Time for Re-Evaluation: Shall We Curtail Diversity Jurisdiction?,44
A.B.A.J. 243, 278, 282-83 (1958); Frankfurter, supra note 22, at 525; Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Cod', 13 Law & Contemp. Prob.
216, 235-40 (1948). H.R. 9622, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 Cong. Rec. H1553 (daily
ed. Feb. 28, 1978), passed by the House, 124 Cong. Rec. H1570 (daily ed. Feb. 28,
1978), and now pending in the Senate, would abolish diversity jurisdiction except in
limited situations.
56. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928), is an example of the extent to which this occurred
under the pre-1958 rules. In Black & White Taxicab, a Kentucky corporation reincorporated in Tennessee to create diversity jurisdiction. The Court held that, because
the reincorporation was valid, it would not examine the party's motives. Id. at 524.
The plaintiff actually made the change to avoid unfavorable Kentucky case law. This
was possible because at that time the federal courts could apply federal law in diversity cases under Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled, Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See C. Wright, supra note 3, § 23, at 86-87.
57. In its official report, the Committee on Jurisdiction and Venue specifically
mentioned "the evil that a corporation, which in reality is a local corporation engaged
in local business and locally owned, can drag its litigation into Federal courts because
it has obtained a charter from another State, and may proceed on a legal fiction that a
diversity of citizenship exists." Hearings, supra note 3, at 8 (statement of Rep.
Ashley).
58. C. Wright, supra note 3, § 23, at 86-87.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 13 2 (c) (1976); see Canton v. Angelina Cas. Co., 279 F.2d 553,
554 (5th Cir. 1960) (Texans asserted workmen's compensation claims against corporation with principal place of business in Texas). The Hearings on the 1958 amendment
indicate that it was not as radical a change as many of the judges and legislators
desired. Proposals made at the time included considering a corporation a citizen of
every state in which it does substantial business or in which it is qualified to do
business, and even to eliminate diversity jurisdiction completely with regard to corporations. Hearings, supra note 3, at 35-39 (statements of Judge Mars and Rep.
Willis). It was suggested that such proposals were not enacted because strenuous
opposition by corporations throughout the country was anticipated. Id. at 35 (statement of Judge Maris).
60. Senate Report, supra note 12, at 4, reprinted in [1964] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 2781.
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scope of diversity jurisdiction by expanding the corporate citizenship
fiction. This had the dual effect of eliminating technical diversity from
a situation in which diversity did not exist in fact and of returning the
situtation to the pre-direct action status quo. 6 1 Those courts that
have fully examined the legislative history and have held that specific
actions are within the coverage of the proviso have essentially determined that these actions are local matters 6 that
Congress felt were
2
more properly allocated to the state courts.
D. Analysis of the Reverse Direct Action
The Fifth Circuit, conscious of Congressional attempts to uphold
the true spirit of diversity jurisdiction, has found that, because there
is only a nominal distinction between those direct actions brought by
and those brought against insurers, no substantial reason exists for
allowing insurer-initiated actions into federal courts. 6 3 The Sixth Circuit, however, has refused to accept this line of thought."' Determining that there is a substantial difference between the two actions, it
has noted that
the injured party .

.

. always ha[s] the option of fully litigating his

claims against the insured party, a fellow resident, in his own local
forum. In other words, the direct action procedure merely provide[s] the injured party with the additional option of bringing a
61. The official purpose of the 1964 amendment, as stated in the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Report, is to eliminate "suits on certain tort claims in which both
parties are local residents" from federal diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 1, reprinted in

[1964] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2778. Additionally, one letter, included in
the Senate Report, states that "'[w]hile within the letter of the diversity jurisdiction,
it appears that 'these direct action cases' are not within its spirit or intent." Letter
from Warren Olney III to Rep. Emanuel Celler (May 16, 1963), reprinted in Senate
Report, supra note 12, at 7, reprinted in [1964] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
2784; see 26 Wayne L. Rev. 1051, 1062 (1980).
62. In Vines v. United States Fidelit, & Guar. Co., 267 F. Supp. 436 (E.D.
Tenn. 1967), for example, the court determined that, as far as jurisdictional considerations were concerned, direct suits under the Tennessee workmen's compensation
law were of the same type as suits under Louisiana's direct action statute. Id. at 439.
The court's major concern was that such local actions, although sounding in contract
rather than tort, would cause overcrowding problems if allowed in the federal courts.
Id. at 438-39; see Hernandez v. Travelers Ins. Co., 489 F.2d 721 (5th Cir.) (agreeing
with Vines reasoning), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974); Lane v. Insurance Co. of N.
Am., 268 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. Tenn. 19672) (same).
63. Campbell v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 552 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1977). The
Campbell court noted that the same reasoning under which the proviso was held
applicable to workmen's compensation actions in Hernandez v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
489 F.2d 721 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974), applied in the reverse
direct action situation. 552 F.2d at 605. The Hernandez court examined the relative
positions of the parties and found the action to be direct, and brought under a policy
of liability insurance. 489 F.2d at 723-25; see note 41 supra.
64. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Ins. Co. v. Greene, 606 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1979).
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federal action, based on diversity jurisdiction, solely against the
out-of-state insurer. Such situation is not analogous to the situation
presented when an action is initiated by an insurance company. If,
pursuant to § 1332(c), a liability insurer is denied access to the
federal courts, the insurer is thereby forced to commence its action
in a foreign jurisdiction, namely the local jurisdiction of the injured
party. In this forum, the out-of-state insurer may, at least in
theory, be subject to a local prejudice in favor of the injured resident. Because of this possibility of prejudice, direct actions brought
by liability insurers, unlike direct actions brought by injured parties, lie squarely within 'the spirit and the intent65 . . . of the diver-

sity jurisdiction of the Federal judicial system.'

Although this argument is compelling on its face, closer examination casts some doubt upon the court's reasoning. The major objection to including insurer-initiated actions within the scope of section
1332(c) is that it forces the insurer to litigate in the home forum of its
adversary.6 6 Arguably, applying the proviso deprives insurers of a
necessary alternative forum. The insurer, however, is forced to defend in a foreign state court when the issue of its liability is brought
through the normal procedure of a direct action by the injured
party. 67 By removing the extra forum provided by the direct procedure, the jurisdictional possibilities available in a particular type of
controversy are made uniform. 68 In both situations, the parties involved in the actual tort 6 9 are local citizens, and the issues are mat-

65. Id. at 127.

66. Id.
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1976). Just as § 1332(c) precludes certain plaintiffs from
bringing actions in federal court, insurers are also precluded from removing actions
to federal court if they could not have been brought there originally. 28 U.S.C. §
1441 (1976); see C. Wright, supra note 3, § 38, at 148-49; cf. Snow v. Ford Motor
Co., 561 F.2d 787, 789 (9th Cir. 1977) (action not removable by defendant because
plaintiff's cause of action failed to satisfy jurisdictional amount requirement);
Cunningham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 297 F. Snpp. 1138, 1139 (E.D.
Tenn. 1969) (motion to remand denied because action not within § 1332(c)).
68. Application of the statute to insurer-initiated a- well as claimant-initiated netions ensures that the extent of the insurer's liability is litigated in state court regardless of which party initiates the action. Campbell v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 552
F.2d 604, 605 (5th Cir 1977). Situations in which the jurisdictional possibilities are
dependent upon which party brings the action can encourage races to the courthouse. Such races are against public policy because they reduce the probability of
calm reflection and negotiation between the parties, aimed at settlement of the controversy. See Board of Educ. v. Department of H.E.W., 396 F. Supp. 203, 250
(S.D. Ohio 1975), affd in part, rev'd in part per curiarn, 532 F.2d 1070 (6th Cir.
1976); Independent Tape Merchants Ass'n v. Creamer, 346 F. Supp. 456, 461-62
(M.D. Pa. 1972); State ex rel. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Terte, 351 Mo. 1089,
1099, 176 S.W.2d 25, 31 (1943) (en banc); notes 77-78 infra and accompanying text.
69. For an action to be considered a "direct action" under § 1332(c), it is not
essential that it sound in tort. Courts have found, for example, that workmen's con-
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ters of local concern. 70 Regardless of whether a foreign insurer is the
nominal plaintiff or defendant in a direct action suit, it represents the
interests of a local, non-diverse party. 7 I The nature of the action is
not changed simply because an insurer chooses to initiate it, rather
than waiting to defend a claim brought by the injured party. The
basic issue in both proceedings is the same, to determine the existence and extent of the insurance company's liability to the injured
2
party.

pensation actions, although technically sounding in contract, are direct actions because the remedies provided by the workmen's compensation laws are inlieu of the
common law tort remedies. McMurrv v. Prudential Property & Cau.. Ins. Co., 4a5S F,
Supp. 209, 212 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (applying § 1332(c) proviso to action under no-fault
insurance contract); Vines v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.. 267 F. Supp. 436,
438 (E.D. Tenn. 1967) (applying § 1332(c) proviso to workmen's compensation action); see Aetna Cas. & Sur. Ins. Co. v. Greene, 606 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1979).
Campbell v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.. 552 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1977); Hernandez v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 489 F.2d 721 (5th Cir.). cert. denied. 419 U.S. 844 (1974).
70. By definition, the injured party and the insured are citizens of the same state
in cases affected by the § 1332(c) proviso. Although local law would be applied by the
federal court should it have jurisdiction, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
there is no need for the federal court to involve itself with such a local matter. 124
Cong. Rec. H1553-54 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Kastenineier).
American Law Institute, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and
Federal Courts 99 (1969) [hereinafter cited as ALl Study]. Freeing the federal courts
from local adjudications is considered by some as essential to the functioning of the
federal court system. See, e.g., Frankfurter. supra note 22. at 506.
71. See Elbert v.Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 202 F.2d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1953)
(Rives, J., dissenting), afffd, 348 U.S. 48 (1954): Ruiz v. Clancy. 182 La. 935, 941-42,
162 So. 734, 736 (1935).
72. The Aetna court characterized that action as one "for the purpose of settling
any compensation claims that might arise as a result of defendant's ... accident."
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Ins. Co. v. Greene, 606 F.2d 123, 125 (6th Cir. 1979). It is
evident that, by bringing such an action, Aetna was anticipating potential claims
against it. See Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 51 (1954). Government Employees Ins. Co. v. LeBleu. 272 F. Supp. 421. 429 (E.D. La. 1967; 1 J.
Moore, supra note 22, 0.77[4]. at 721.3-.4. Government Employees Ins. Co. v.
LeBleu, 272 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. La. 1967). a well-reasoned district court case, provides some helpful insights into the logic behind the Fifth Circuit's more expansive,
common-sense approach to the § 1332(c) proviso. The court held that because the
insurer in that case initiated a declaratory judgment action against its insured, and
not against the injured party, the suit was not a "direct action" as described in the
proviso. Id. at 430-31. It also stated, however, that "for purposes of determining the
existence of federal jurisdiction, a cause of action must be considered as having been
brought by the party, asserting it,regardless of which party initiates the proceeding. . . . [J]urisdiction must be shown to exist over the cause of action had it been
brought under conventional procedures." Id. at 427. Furthermore. the court agreed
with the contention that "the basic principles and concepts governing declaratory
judgment procedure compel us to apply the § 1332(c) proviso to actions which. although instituted by the insurer ... are in reality 'direct actions against the insurer.' " Id. at 429.
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Furthermore, when deciding questions of jurisdiction, federal
courts generally examine the nature of the proceedings as a whole,
rather than the technical position of parties. 73 Thus, when diversity
is in question, courts ignore nominal or collusive arrangements of par74
ties designed to create complete diversity when none exists in fact.
Similarly, in matters of federal question jurisdiction, they ignore less
important features of an action, such as which party initiated it, and
75
look instead to the nature of the action.
Congress clearly favored having an insurer defend the issue of its
liability in its adversary's local forum when the injured party brings
the action. 7 6 The same considerations should govern when the insurer is the nominal plaintiff. To conclude otherwise would be to
allow insurance companies to avoid the citizenship characteristics conferred on them by Congress by simply initiating an action before
their adversaries. 77 In light of the policy to discourage such "races to
court," 7 8 it is difficult to imagine that Congress intended that federal

73. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. LeBleu, 272 F. Supp. 421, 427 (E.D. La. 1967); see
cases cited notes 74-75 infra.
74. Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 69 (1941); City of Dawson v.
Columbia Trust Co., 197 U.S. 178, 180 (1905); C. Wright, supra note 3, § 30, at
110. "In determining whether diversity jurisdiction exists, the alignment of the parties as plaintiffs and defendants in the pleadings is not conclusive. It is the duty of
the court to 'look beyond the pleadings, and arrange the parties according to their
sides in the dispute.' " Id.(quoting City of Dawson v. Columbia Trust Co., 197 U.S.
178, 180 (1905)).
75. Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 248 (1952); Monks v,
Hetherington, 430 F. Supp. 491, 492 (W.D. Okla. 1977), aff'd, 573 F.2d 1164 (10th
Cir. 1978).
76. See notes 60-61 supra and accompanying text.
77. Thus, an insurer, by anticipating a claim and commencing a declaratory
judgment action, could effectively defeat the Congressional purpose to clear the federal dockets of "certain tort claims in which both parties are local residents, but
which . . .may be brought directly against a foreign insurance carrier without joining
the local tort-feasor as a defendant." Senate Report, supra note 12, at 1, reprinted in
[1964] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2778-79.
78. State ex rel. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Terte, 351 Mo. 1089, 1099, 176
S.W.2d 25, 31 (1943) (en bane). See also Board of Educ. v. Department of H.E.W.,
396 F. Supp. 203, 250 (S.D. Ohio 1975), aff'd in part, rev'd in part per curiam, 532
F.2d 1070 (6th Cir. 1976); Independent Tape Merchants Ass'n v. Creamer, 346 F.
Supp. 456, 461 (M.D. Pa. 1972). In Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S.
237 (1952), the Court stated that the declaratory judgment procedure could not be
used to create federal question jurisdiction by a party asserting what is really a federal law defense to an anticipated claim, who beats his adversary to court. Id. at 248.
It reasoned that "[flederal courts will not seize litigations from state courts merely
because one, normally a defendant, goes to federal court to begin his federal-law'
defense before the state court begins the case under state law." Id. The basis of this
position is that the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976), is merely a
procedural vehicle for causes of action otherwise within the jurisdiction of federal
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subject matter
jurisdiction could be created through such tactical
79
maneuvering.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The goal of federal judiciary acts and related legislation is to ensure
the smooth and efficient functioning of our national court system. 8 0
Proper administration of this dual system requires constant adjustment to societal and economic changes that affect the nature and volume of litigation. 8 ' One of the most important, yet most difficult,
tasks in this adjustment process is to achieve a fair balance of power
between the federal system and the state judiciaries.8 2 State courts
must be allowed to retain enough autonomy to protect their integrity
and effectiveness, and federal courts must be left with enough time
and energy to devote to adjudication of the "great issues of government." 8 3

courts. Geni-Chlor Int'l, Inc. v. Multisonics Dev. Corp., 580 F.2d 981, 984 (9th Cir.
1978); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. LeBleu, 272 F. Supp. 421, 428 (E.D. La.
1967).
79. The strict attitude of Congress towards the use of artificial devices to create
federal subject matter jurisdiction is evidenced by the Judicial Code provision that
states that "[a] district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which any
party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively made or joined
to invoke the jurisdiction of such court." 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1976); see S%ick v
Benscoter, 462 F. Supp. 24, 26 (E. D. Pa. 1978); Asher v. Pacific Power & Light Co.,
249 F. Supp. 671, 674 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
80. Felix Frankfurter, expanding upon the numerous goals such legislation must
accomplish if the smooth functioning of the federal court system is to be realized,
stated that "[t]o mobilize adequately the resources of the judicial establishment, to
simplify as much as possible the inevitable complexities of a system of courts spanning a continent, to secure a fair balance between the federal system and state
judiciaries, to relieve the Supreme Court from all obstructions to the performance of
its functions,-these have been the aims of legislation regulating the organization of
the federal courts." Frankfurter, supra note 22, at 502.
81. Id. at 503.
82. Id. Frankfurter described the problem of arriving at the proper distribution of
authority-the power to hear cases-between the federal and state courts as "a
complication peculiar to a federated nation. Here is a conflict full of political explosives, because entangled in the complex of relations between states and nation. These
are issues of the very stuff of American politics . . . .They are not technical issues,
nor within the special province of lawyers." Id. at 500; see 124 Cong. Reec. H1554
(daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier).
83. Frankfurter refers to the adjudication of the "great issues of government" to
describe the construction and application of the United States Constitution. Frankfurter, supra note 22, at 503. President Taft saw this as "[t]he most important function
of the court." Taft, The Attacks on the Courts and Legal Procedure, Ky. L.J. Nov.
1916, at 3, 18; see 124 Cong. Rec. H1554 (daily ed. Feb. 28. 1978 (remarks of Rep.
Kastenmeier).
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The traditional justification for federal diversity jurisdiction is the
guarantee that a citizen, forced to litigate in a foreign jurisdiction,
will have access to an impartial forum.8 4 This remains a valid and
important function of the federal courts. 8 5 In view of the enormous
strain placed on the federal court system by overcrowded dockets,
however, the instances in which a federal court should be made available must be reevaluated.8 6 Efficient functioning of both state and

84. James Madison's statement during the Virginia debates on the Constitution is
indicative of the role diversity jurisdiction was intended to play in the national court
scheme. He stated that "[i]t may happen that a strong prejudice may arise, in some
states, against the citizens of others, who may have claims against them. We know
what tardy, and even defective, administration of justice has happened in some
states. A citizen of another state might not chance to get justice in a state court, and
at all events he might think himself injured." 3 J. Elliot, The Debates in the Several
State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 533 (2d ed. 1941)
[hereinafter cited as Elliot's Debates] (quoting James Madison). Although he was a
proponent of diversity jurisdiction, Madison did not consider it necessary. Id.("I will
not say it is a matter of much importance. Perhaps it might be left to the state
courts." (quoting James Madison)). This view was also held by John Marshall. Id.at
556; see 124 Cong. Rec. H1555 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Rallsback).
85. When there actually is a controversy between two individual citizens of
different states, federal diversity jurisdiction provides a useful and sometimes necessary alternative to trial in the home forum of either party. A number of commentators still support retention of diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 Yale L.J. 7 (1963); Marbury, Why Should We Limit
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction?, 46 A.B.A.J. 379 (1960); Moore & Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future, 43 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1964); Phillips &
Christenson, Should Corporations Be Regarded as Citizens Within the Diversity
JurisdictionProvisions?, 48 A.B.A.J. 435 (1962); Wright, The Federal Courts and the
Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 Wayne L. Rev. 317 (1967). But cf. H.R. 9622,
95th Cong., 1st Sess., 124 Cong. Rec. H1553 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978) (to abolish
diversity jurisdiction completely); R. Jackson, The Supreme Court in the American
System of Government 38 (1955) (arguing that Congress should abolish diversity
jurisdiction); Bratton, Diversity Jurisdiction-An Idea Whose Time Has Passed 51
Ind. L.J. 347 (1976) (advocating adoption of proposals for decreasing diversity jurisdiction); Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. Clhi. L.
Rev. 1 (1968) (criticizing ALI's suggestion to redefine diversity jurisdiction as too
complex). One of the original goals of diversity jurisdiction, for example, was to encourage entrepreneurial investment in the more remote and less developed areas of
our nation. C. Wright, supra note 3, § 23, at 91. This goal has been realized with
great success. Committee on Jurisdiction and Venue of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Report (March 12, 1951) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Conference Report], reprinted in Hearings, supra note 3, at 13. Although, given the degree of
economic mobility now present in the American business world, encouragement of
investment across state lines is no longer an important goal, ALI Study, supra note
70, at 105, diversity does provide an additional safeguard for the interests of the
prospective entrepreneur. Judicial Conference Report, supra, reprinted in Hearings,
supra note 3, at 9.
86. McMurrv v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 458 F. Supp. 209, 212
(E.D. Mich. 1978). "It is unwise to paralyze the federal courts by maintaining conditions that will generate constant and unending pressure for the expansion of the
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federal tribunals requires that the number of cases heard by the federal courts under diversity jurisdiction be limited to those in which
there is a legitimate8 7need to afford one or more parties an alternative
to the state forum.
There are two major policy arguments against allowing an out-ofstate insurer access to an alternative forum when it commences the
action. First, the insurance company is typically a large corporation
that actively seeks customers in broad geographical areas without regard to state lines. 8 8 Although it may neither be chartered nor have
its principal place of business in the state in which the direct action
arises, it has, by soliciting and procuring its insured's business,
availed itself of that state's benefits and protections. 8 9 It should, therefore, be held to have acceded to that state's judicial processes. 90 Additionally, insurance companies often seek to force prospective claimants into unwanted settlements by initiating wvars of attrition through

federal judiciary. It is intolerable that these delays and these pressures be produced
by cases that have no proper place in the federal courts." ALl Stud', supra note 70,
at 1.
87. One of the functions of the federal courts is to serve as an example to other
tribunals in matters of procedural and administrative reform. 1 J. Moore, supra note
22, 0.71[3.-2], at 701.31. It is, therefore, desirable that a number of attorneys from
every state be exposed to the judicial process in federal courts. Diversity jurisdiction
has been an important means of carring on this instructive process. ld. If this practice is carried too far, however, it becomes counter-productive. The easy accessibility
of the federal courts not only may cause overcrowded dockets, as in Louisiana, see
notes 12-14, 20 supra and accompanying text, but may actually inhibit state court
reform by withdraoving "from the incentives and energies for reforming state tribunals . . . the interests of influential groups who through diversity litigation are now
enabled to avoid state courts." Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48,
60 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); accord Frankfurter, supra note 22, at 522.
88. See Direct Actions, supra note 16, at 38.
89. The Supreme Court held in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U S.
220 (1957), that an insurance company, which had sold a policy to a California citizen, but which had no office in California, had availed itself sufficiently of that state's
benefits and protections to satisf, the minimum contacts test of International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Although these cases applied the minimum
contacts test to determine amenity to process in a given state, satisfaction of the same
criteria arguably indicates an acceptance of that state's judicial processes. See ALI
Study, supra note 70, at 109-10 (noting that corporations that do business in a given
state are aware of that state's local laws and of the quality of its justice administration).
90. ALI Study', supra note 70, at 109-10. This position has been incorporated into
the American Law Institute's additions to the diversit%' statute. Id. at 112 (proposed §
1302(b)). Additionally, prevention of similar advantages for foreign corporations was a
major reason for passage of the 1958 amendment. Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No.
85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415. Congress considered it unfair that a basically local corporation with a foreign charter should have a choice of federal or state forum when its
neighbor with a local charter did not. Hearings, supra note 3, at 29 (statement of
Judge Maris).
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various dilatory tactics. 9 1 Thus, access to federal court may give an
insurance company an unfair advantage in those large metropolitan
areas in which overcrowded federal dockets have produced long
calendar delays.
Second, the sole justification for this distinction-the fear that
out-of-state insurers may be subject to local prejudice in state
courts 9 2 -is no longer viable when balanced against the very real
threat to judicial efficiency caused by overcrowded federal dockets.
Fear of judicial prejudice on the basis of statehood was a valid concern when diversity jurisdiction was first adopted. 93 At that time, the
states maintained many of the attributes of independent nations, including a healthy partisanship on behalf of their citizens. 9 4 Their
political and judicial systems were comparatively new, autonomous,
and independent of any national influence towards uniformity.9
Political and societal changes, however, have reduced the instances in
which fear of local prejudice is legitimate. 9 6 Although personal prejudice still exists in many forms, prejudice on the basis of statehood is
one of the least prevalent. 97 Politically, the independence of the

91. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 58 (1954); 124 Cong.
Rec. H1555 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier). For example,
weighing the relative disadvantages of being subjected either to delay or review of
jury findings, Louisiana plaintiffs chose the former. See note 14 supra. Where the
scope of appellate review is less broad, as it is in most other large metropolitan areas,
the delay in the federal courts would be welcomed by the insurers who have the
financial advantage in expensive wars of attrition. See Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v.
Elbert, 348 U.S. at 58.
92. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Ins. Co. v. Greene, 606 F.2d 123, 127 (6th Cir. 1979).
93. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816); Bank of
the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809); 3 Elliot's Debates,
supra note 84, at 553; The Federalist No. 80 (A. Hamilton) [hereinafter cited as
Hamilton].
94. For a brief description of the various quirks of the state judiciaries and legislatures, see Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 Harv. L. Rev.
483 (1928). Despite the paucity of documented evidence of judicial prejudice during
the late eighteenth century, id. at 493, it is almost "incredible that in the narrow,
provincial, petty spirit of inter-colonial relations, there should not have been local
bias in the administration of justice." Frank, Historical Bases of the FederalJudicial
System, 13 Law & Contemp. Prob. 3, 23-24 (1948). Frank bases this statement on
the numerous examples of state partisanship collected by Professors Yntema and Jaffin. See Yntema & Jaffin, PreliminaryAnalysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 869, 876 n.13 (1931).
95. See Yntema & Jafin, supra note 94, at 876 n.13.
96. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 59-60 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); 124 Cong. Rec. H1556 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep.
Bennet); ALl Study, supra note 70, at 106. But see Judicial Conference Report,
supra note 85, reprinted in Hearings, supra note 3, at 11-12 (expressing view that
local prejudice still considered a factor by prospective "business litigants ,).
97. 124 Cong. Rec. H1554 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 19735) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier); ALI Study, supra note 70, at 106. Indeed, one survey of attorneys who had
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states has weakened considerably. 98 The state judiciaries are now
well-established 9 9 and, with minor exceptions, 10 0 sufficiently uniform
to ensure that a litigant from another state will receive due process
without unfair procedural or substantive surprise.1 0 1 Insurance companies engaged in multistate operations are well aware of the possibility of becoming involved in litigation in the states of those they insure. 10 2 They should not be allowed to pursue the tactical or dilatory
advantages sometimes available in the federal forum under the guise
of avoiding state-based prejudice in the local courts.10 3 Thus, given
tried diversity cases indicated that fear of local prejudice against their clients was one
of the least influential factors in their preference for the federal forum. Only 4.3% of
the 164 responses elicited in the survey mentioned local prejudice as a factor, and it
was never cited as the controlling reason for choosing the federal court. Summers,
Analysis of Factors that Influence Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases, 47 Iowa L.
Rev. 933, 937-38 (1962). It is worth noting that in six of the seven instances when
local prejudice was mentioned, the attorney's client was an insurance company. Thus,
it appears "that attorneys do not differentiate between biases related to the nature of
the client's business and those related to his nonresidency." Id. at 939. But see 51
Va. L. Rev. 178, 179 (1965) (survey indicating local prejudice against out-of-state
client as important factor in choice of forum).
98. Perhaps this was overstated by Representative William Tuck during the hearings on the 1958 amendment. "[A] greedy and Gargantuan Central Government in
the last few years has usurped the powers of the States by expanding its activities
into almost every phase of our existence, and we can feel its tentacles in all walks of
life." Hearings, supra note 3, at 3 (statement of Rep. Tuck).
99. See R. Jackson, supra note 85, at 38-39. James Madison, one of diversity
jurisdiction's chief proponents, believed that, once state tribunals were established,
Congress would divest federal courts of the power to hear cases between citizens of
different states. 3 Elliot's Debates, supra note 84, at 536.
100. See, e.g., Amsterdam, Criminal ProsecutionsAffecting Federally Guaranteed
Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court
Trial, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 793, 794-99 (1965) (describing questionable performance of
Mississippi state courts in prosecutions arising from civil rights activities).
101. 124 Cong. Rec. H1554 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier). "[A]rguments stemming from a supposed inferiority of state justice are insusceptible of proof and hardly politic to advance." C. Wright. supra note 3, § 23, at 90.
There was a longstanding argument, first espoused by Alexander Hamilton, that diversity jurisdiction was necessary to ensure that citizens of each state are given all
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states. Hamilton, supra note
93. This argument, however, has been characterized as specious because any violation of the privileges and immunities clause is in itself grounds for federal question
jurisdiction. Friendly, supra note 94. at 492 n.44.
102. By its nature, liability insurance involves an insurance company in claims
asserted against its individual clients, wherever thay are located. If there is a risk that
those claims may arise and be litigated in a foreign jurisdiction, the insurer should be
held to have assumed that risk. Letter from William M. Shernoff to Michael Remington (Aug. 29, 1977), reprinted in Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction/lMagistrates
Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary. 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 293-94
(1977); ALI Study, supra note 70, at 109.
103. A number of commentators have noted that diversity jurisdiction is most
often used for tactical purposes rather than to ensure impartial trials. See, e.g-. C.
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the severe problems of overcrowding faced by the entire federal court
system, a merely theoretical fear of state-based prejudice must yield
to the documented, practical fact that litigants with legitimate federal
adequate and timely consideration
law questions are not receiving
10 4
from the federal courts.
CONCLUSION

Abuses of diversity jurisdiction and increasingly congested federal
court dockets are problems in our national court system. Determining
that the section 1332(c) proviso is applicable to insurer-initiated direct
actions might not solve these administrative problems. It would,
however, be an important step in the context of the currently evolving policies of the judiciary, the bar, and Congress respecting the
proper role of diversity jurisdiction within this system. Furthermore,
if a solution is to be found short of abolishing diversity jurisdiction
completely, Congress and the judiciary must join in an effort to reduce the instances in which diversity is available as a mere luxury to
litigants, rather than a needed protection of their rights. Legislation
modifying the rules towards this end is the first step; judicial implementation of such modification is the necessary second.
William Murphy

Wright, supra note 3, 1 23, at 91 ("Undoubtedly, so long as diversity exists, the
choice of forum will be utilized for tactical purposes by particular litigants in particular cases, who think they may obtain an advantage from one forum or the other, but
to the extent this exists ... it would seem more an abuse of concurrent jurisdiction
than an argument for its retention." (footnote omitted)); Kennedy, Federal Diversity
Jurisdiction, 10 U. Kan. L. Rev. 47, 54 (1961) (tactical advantages of filing in federal
court include liberal discovery and could mean difference between winning or losing
case); Summers, supra note 97, at 937-38 (statistical survey indicating prevalence of
tactical purposes in decisions to invoke diversity jurisdiction); 51 Va. L. Rev. 178,
179 (1965) (factors leading to preference for federal court when representing defendant).
104. In holding the proviso applicable to actions brought under no-fault insurance
contracts, one court stated that "where there are larger federal interests at stake-in
this case, reducing the overload on federal dockets-it is incumbent upon a federal
court to apply the law to further the congressional policy." McMurry v. Prudential
Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 458 F. Supp. 209, 213 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (footnote omitted); see Miller v. Davis. 507 F.2d 308, 314 (6th Cir. 1974).

